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Abstract:  In this article, we analyze whether the manipulation of stock options still continues to 
this day.  Our evidence shows that executives continue to employ a variety of manipulative 
devices to increase their compensation, including backdating, bullet-dodging, and spring-
loading.  Overall, we find that as a result of these manipulative devices executives are able to 
increase their compensation by about 6%.  We suggest a simple new rule to end all dating games 
in executive compensation. We propose that all grants of stock options in executive 
compensation be awarded on a daily pro-rata basis and priced accordingly.  This proposal would 
leave no incentive to game option grant dates or manipulate information flow.  
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Introduction 
 
It has been nearly ten years since 2006 when the scandals broke regarding the backdating 
of executive stock option grants.
1
  Stock option packages in executive compensation, once 
heralded as a simple device to solve the agency problem inherent in the separation of ownership 
and control to align the interests of management with those of the shareholders,
2
 were found to 
be too tempting to leave to chance.  Executives found ways to manipulate the size of their 
compensation by fraudulently changing the date of a grant, i.e., backdating or forward-dating, so 
that options that were meant to be granted “at-the-money” as of the grant date were “in-the-
money” instead.  This provides top executives and directors with an immediate unearned bonus.3  
Researchers have documented that option backdating resulted in an average loss of about eight 
percent to shareholders, or about $500 million per firm.
4
 This meant that on average, executives 
gained over $500,000 per firm each year.
5
 
 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX),
6
 which was meant to bring transparency and 
honesty to financial statements,
7
 was passed in reaction to massive corporate frauds such as 
Worldcom,
8
 Tyco,
9
 and Enron.
10
 With regarding to stopping options backdating, however, SOX 
has been a spectacular failure.  Executives have simply ignored SOX’s two-day reporting 
requirements and fraudulently manipulated their compensation.
11
 In addition, SOX has failed to 
prevent other forms of stock option value manipulation, i.e. spring-loading and bullet-dodging.   
                                                     
1
 Linda Chatman Thomsen, Dir. of Div. of Enforcement, Speech by SEC Staff: Options Backdating: The 
Enforcement Perspective (Oct. 30, 2006), in https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2006/spch103006lct.htm (discussing 
the SEC’s ongoing investigation into 100 potential abuses of stock options and enforcement plans). 
2
 See Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation: Where We Are, and How We Got There 1, 24 (Marshall Sch. Of 
Bus. Working Paper No. FBE 07.12, 2012), (forthcoming in HANDBOOK ECON. FIN. (eds. George Constantinides, 
Milton Harris, & Rene Stulz)); Jay M. Zitter, Liability for Backdating of Stock Options Under Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b), and 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5, 32 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 85 (2008). 
3
 Murphy, supra note 2, at 90.  
4
 M.P. Narayanan, Cindy A. Schipani, & H. Nejat Seyhun, The Economic Impact of Backdating of Executive Stock 
Options, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1597, 1597 (June 2007) [hereinafter Narayanan et al.].  
5
 Id.  
6
 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. no. 107-204 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 28, 
and 29 U.S.C.) [hereinafter SOX].   
7
 See, e.g., infra Part I discussing § 302 of SOX requirements. See also Spencer C. Barasch & J. David Washburn, 
Decoding the Stock Option Backdating Scandal, 4 CORP. COUNS. ST. BAR SECTION NEWSL. 1, 5 (Summer 2006). 
8
 See DENNIS R. BERESFORD ET AL., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF WORLDCOM, INC. (2003); see also BOB LYKE & MARK JICKLING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RS21253, WORLDCOM: THE ACCOUNTING SCANDAL (2002), available at 
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/RS21253_08292002.pdf. 
9
 Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Brings Settled Charges against Tyco International Ltd. Alleging 
Billion Dollar Accounting Fraud (Apr. 17, 2006), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-58.htm. 
10
 Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Jeffrey K. Skilling, Enron’s Former President, Chief 
Executive Officer and Chief Operating Officer, with Fraud (Feb. 19, 2004), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-
18.htm.  
11
 Erik Lie, On the Timing of CEO Stock Option Awards, 51 MGMT. SCI. 802-12 (2005); M. P. Narayanan & H. 
Nejat Seyhun, Do Managers Influence Their Pay? Evidence from Stock Price Reversals Around Executive Option 
Grants (Ross Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 927, Jan. 2005), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=649804 (finding that executive options are backdated); M. P. 
Narayanan & H. Nejat Seyhun, Effect of Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the Influencing of Executive Compensation ( Nov. 
2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=852964 (again finding that options are backdated and that SOX 
mandatory grant date reporting decreases, but does not eliminate opportunism); Randall A. Heron & Erik Lie, Does 
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In this study, we show that despite the effect of SOX and all the reforms in response to 
the backdating scandal of 2006,
12
 manipulation of options is still too tempting and continues to 
this day.  Our evidence shows that executives employ a variety of manipulative devices to 
increase their compensation, including backdating, bullet-dodging, and spring-loading.  
Although each of these practices in isolation may have a marginal impact on their compensation, 
together, these manipulative devices unfairly tilt the balance in executives’ favor in a meaningful 
way.  Overall, we find that as a result of these manipulative devices executives are able to 
increase their compensation by about 6%.  Further regulation is thus needed to ensure honesty 
and transparency in corporate financial statements, and promote market fairness.  
 
This paper proceeds as follows.  Part I provides an overview of the various ways 
executives have been found to manipulate option grants to increase their compensation, 
including backdating, forward-dating, spring-loading, and bullet-dodging.  Part II details our 
empirical study demonstrating that these schemes exist and continue today.  In Part III, we 
analyze these manipulative behaviors and argue that they should be considered violations of § 
10(b)
13
 and Rule 10(b)(5)
14
 of the 1934 Securities Act.  Part IV discusses why these behaviors 
also violate the fiduciary duties of officers and directors under state laws.  Proposals for reform 
are presented in Part V, followed by our concluding remarks.  
 
 
I. Stock Options:  Potential for Abuse 
 
Including stock options as part of the executive compensation package can have 
important advantages.  For instance, it can lead to an alignment of interests for managers and 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Backdating Explain the Stock Price Pattern Around Executive Stock Option Grants?, 83 J. FIN. ECON. 271 (2007) 
[hereinafter Heron & Lie, Does Backdating Explain] (finding significantly less abnormal stock returns after the 
passing of the SOX, and that “in those cases in which grants are reported within one day of the grant date, the 
pattern has completely vanished, but it continues to exist for grants reporting with longer lags, and its magnitude 
tends to increase with the reporting delay.”); M.P. Narayanan & Nejat Seyhun, The Dating Game: Do Managers 
Designate Option Grant Dates to Increase Their Compensation?, 21 REV. FIN. STUD. 975-1007 (2008). See also 
Jesse M. Fried, Option Backdating and Its Implications, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 853, 856-57 (2008) (stating that 
“thousands of firms continued to secretly backdate options by weeks or months after SOX, even though it entailed—
in addition to other legal violations—a blatant disregard of the Act’s two-day requirement.”); Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, Executive Compensation: Who Decides?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1615, 1642 (2005) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 7243, 
15 U.S.C. § 78m(k) and 15 U.S.C. § 7244) (arguing that executive compensation is indirectly regulated by SOX. 
Specifically, it forces the CEO and CFO to return “any bonus, incentive, or equity-based compensation” in the 
previous year if the company has to restate its financial statements due to misconduct; it precludes corporations from 
giving loans to executives and directors; and outlaws executive trading during “blackout periods.”); Smith, Gambrell 
& Russell, LLP, Options Backdating: Scrutinizing Options-Based Compensation Practices, 18 TRUST THE LEADERS 
(Spring 2007), available at 
http://www.sgrlaw.com/resources/trust_the_leaders/leaders_issues/ttl18/817/ (stating that it is 
widely believed that SOX “short-circuited” options backdating). 
12
 Especially, the SEC’s adoption of new disclosure requirements regarding executive compensation including a 
“Compensation Discussion and Analysis” section and specific requirements for disclosure of option grants. Press 
Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Votes to Adopt Changes to Disclosure Requirements Concerning Executive 
Compensation and Related Matters (July 26, 2006), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-123.htm. 
13
 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2015). 
14
 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2015). 
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shareholders.
15
 It may also allow firms that want to conserve resources to remain attractive to the 
best talent.
16
  Startups, in particular, find stock options useful because they often have growth 
potential, but shallow pockets initially.
17
  Yet, in executive compensation plans, stock options 
can be, and have often been, abused.  
 
Professor David Yermack first found irregularities in stock price returns around executive 
stock option grants in 1997.
18
  He argued that the executives accelerated the date of the grants 
when the corporation is getting ready to release good news.
19
  In the early 2000s, researchers 
provided evidence that managers manipulate the release of information around option grant dates 
to maximize the value of those grants.
20
   
 
As the use of stock options increased, so did the interest of the government to restrict the 
potential for abuse.   SOX requires “real-time disclosure of option grants.”21  Section 302 of 
SOX demands that CEOs and CFOs of public corporations state that they have reviewed the 
company’s quarterly and annual reports and explicitly confirm that “(1) the financial statements 
and information is materially accurate, (2) disclosure controls and procedures are effective and 
(3) they have disclosed to the company’s auditors and audit committee any control 
deficiencies.”22 False statements made under SOX could subject the individual to enforcement 
by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), Department of Justice (DOJ) prosecution, and/or 
civil litigation instituted by shareholders.
23
 
 
Backdating was discovered simultaneously by Professors Lie, Heron, Narayanan and 
Seyhun and reported in the financial press as early as February 2005.
24
 Researchers showed that 
managers falsified grant dates to receive options with lower strike prices.
25
  The stock price of 
                                                     
15
 Zitter, supra note 2. See also Randall S. Kroszner et al., Economic Organization and Competition Policy, 19 
YALE J. ON REG. 51, 58 (2002). 
16
 Id.  
17
 Id. See also David I. Walker, Unpacking Backdating: Economic Analysis and Observations on the Stock Option 
Scandal, 87 B.U.L. REV. 561, 567 (June 2007). 
18
 David Yermack, Good Timing: CEO Stock Option Awards and Company News Announcement, 52 J. FIN. 449, 
449-75 (1997).  
19
 Id.  
20
 David Aboody & Ron Kasznik, CEO Stock Option Awards and the Timing of Corporate Voluntary Disclosures, 
29 J. ACCT. & ECON., 73, 73-100 (2000); Keith Chauvin & Catherine Shenoy, Stock Price Decreases Prior to 
Executive Stock-option Grants, 7 J. CORP. FIN. 53, 53-76 (2001). 
21
 SOX, supra note 6.  
22
 Barasch & Washburn, supra note 7; see id. § 302, 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a). 
23
 See SOX § 906 (subjecting CEOs/CFOs to criminal penalties for knowingly certifying inadequate financial 
statements). While SOX does not explicitly include civil liability provisions on the basis of falsifying financial 
statements, § 302 violations have had a bearing on civil suits and SEC enforcement actions brought under other 
provisions. See Jenny B. Davis, Sorting Out Sarbanes-Oxley: Determining How to Comply with the New Federal 
Disclosure Law for Corporations Won’t Be Easy, 89 A.B.A.J. 44, 48 (Feb. 2003).   
24
 See supra note 11.  See also Jay Ritter, Forensic Finance, 22 J. ECON. PERSP. 127, 133 (2008); Mark Hulbert, Test 
of Good Corporate Citizenship, MARKET WATCH (Feb. 18, 2005, 12:15 AM), available at 
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/timing-of-managers-option-grants-a-good-litmus-test. 
25
 Ritter writes: 
On January 19, 2000, when computer manufacturer Apple’s stock closed at 
$106.56 per share, Apple announced that one week previously it had granted 
options to buy 10 million shares to CEO Steve Jobs with an exercise price of the 
January 12 closing market price of $87.19. The January 12th close was the 
5 
 
the company would decline right before the exercise of the grant and increase thereafter.
26
  In 
2008 and 2009, research further suggested that managers are likely to make beneficial 
accounting changes to the CEO prior to option grant dates.
27
 
 
There are several possible forms of option timing manipulation observed in the empirical 
literature.  First, as described above, options may be backdated.
28
  Second, executives may alter 
the exercise date of an option, rather than its grant date.
29
 Third, executives may manipulate the 
timing of information release, announcing positive information about the company (i.e. spring-
loading) immediately before the grant date or negative information about the company (i.e. 
bullet-dodging) immediately after the grant date.
30
 Alternatively, executives may manipulate the 
timing of stock option awards to occur shortly before an already scheduled release of positive 
information about the company (again spring-loading) or shortly after the release of negative 
information about the company (again bullet-dodging).
31
 These manipulative practices are 
described further below. 
 
A.  Options Backdating 
 
Options backdating is a practice whereby the date of the option grant is changed to a date 
prior to when the option was in fact granted.  This practice was possible and easy when the SEC 
rules did not require reporting of the issuance of stock options until months after the grant date.
32
  
This reporting delay allowed companies to wait until the company’s stock price fell low and 
moved higher before submitting their disclosure forms.
33
  The option would then be backdated at 
                                                                                                                                                                           
lowest closing price of the two months prior to January 19. Seven years later, 
Apple admitted that the dates of many options grants had been chosen 
retroactively, and that documents purporting to show that the board of directors 
had approved the grants on the dates chosen had in some cases been fabricated. 
Wealth transfers from option backdating can be large. For the January 2000 
grant alone, if there was a 70 percent chance that the options would eventually 
be exercised, the difference between the January 12th and 19th dates for the 
exercise price was worth almost $140 million to Jobs due to the difference 
between the $87.19 and $106.56 exercise prices. 
Id. at 131-32. See also Robert M. Daines, Grant R. McQueen, & Robert J. Schonlau, Right on schedule: CEO 
Option Grants and Opportunism 2 (Working Paper, revised Mar. 31, 2015) [hereinafter Daines et al.]; Lie, supra 
note 11; Heron & Lie, Does Backdating Explain, supra note 11; Randall Heron & Erik Lie, What Fraction of Stock 
Option Grants to Top Executives Have Been Backdated or Manipulated?, 55 MGMT. SCI. 513-25 (2009)[hereinafter 
Heron & Lie, What Fraction]; Narayanan & Seyhun, supra note 11.  
26
 This is illustrated by a V-shape on a graph.  
27
 Daines et al, supra note 25, at 2 (citing Mary L. McAnally et al., Executive Stock Options, Missed Earnings 
Targets, and Earnings Management, 83 ACCT. REV. 185-216 (2008); Terry A. Baker et al., Incentives and 
Opportunities to Manage Earnings around Option Grants, 26 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 649-672 (2009)). 
28
 See Lie, supra note 25; Heron & Lie, Does Backdating Explain, supra note 12; Heron & Lie, What Fraction, 
supra note 25. 
29
 See Yermack, supra note 18. 
30
 See Aboody & Kasznik, supra note 20; Chauvin & Shenoy, supra note 20. 
31
 See Daines et al., supra note 25, at 3 (finding that there is abnormal price patterns around scheduled CEO grants 
post-2006). 
32
 Previously, option grants could be reported on Form 5, which is due 45 days after the end of the fiscal year. Heron 
& Lie, Does Backdating Explain, supra note 11, at 272. 
33
 Christopher Cox, Chairman of the SEC, Testimony Concerning Options Backdating (Sept. 6, 2006), available at 
https://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2006/ts090606cc.htm. 
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its lowest point or near that point, so that this lower exercise price could then be reported to the 
SEC.
34
 Backdating of stock options thus allows the individual to benefit from larger gains, while 
the company does not have to report these gains as compensation on its financial statement.
35
   
 
Shortly after SOX was signed into law, the SEC changed its rule to also require 
disclosure within two days of the option grant,
36
 thereby effectively closing the loophole giving 
rise to backdating.
37
  This information must be disclosed electronically, allowing shareholders 
access to the information almost instantly.
38
 Furthermore, the SEC approved changes to the New 
York Stock Exchange and the NASDAQ Stock Market listing standards, which mandate that 
nearly all equity compensation plans be presented to shareholders for a vote.
39
  The terms of the 
plan must be disclosed, as well as whether it allows for the exercise price to be less than the fair 
market value at the time of the grant.
40
  Nevertheless, based on what the backdating studies have 
discovered,
41
 it appears that executives have simply ignored these requirements and continued 
their backdating practice. 
 
In December 2004, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued the 
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (FAS) 123R, which essentially eradicated the 
accounting benefit of stock options issued at-the-money.
42
  The Standards state that all stock 
options granted to any employee must be documented as an expense on the financial statements 
regardless of whether the exercise price is at fair market value.
43
  In 2006, the SEC began to 
require all public companies to also report information including: “the grant date fair value under 
FAS 123R (which is aggregated in the total compensation amount that is shown for each named 
executive officer); the FAS 123 grant date; the closing market price on the grant date if it is 
greater than the exercise price of the option; and the date of the compensation committee or full 
board of directors took action to grant the option, if that date is different than the grant date.”44 
Companies are also required to explain the goals and policies behind the executive compensation 
plans.
45
 Reports to investors must discuss whether the company has backdated executive stock 
options (or utilized “any of the many variations on that theme concerning the timing and pricing 
of options”) or might do so in the future and, if so, how.46 Once again, these changes have been 
ineffective in stopping executive malfeasance with respect to option grants.   
                                                     
34
 Christopher Cox, Chairman of the SEC, Testimony Concerning Options Backdating (Sept. 6, 2006), available at 
https://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2006/ts090606cc.htm. 
35
 Id. 
36
 See SEC, Ownership Reports and Trading by Officers, Directors and Principal Security Holders, Release No. 34-
46421, Sec. II.B (Aug. 27, 2002), https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/34-46421.htm. 
37
 Barasch & Washburn, supra note 7. 
38
 Cox, supra note 33. 
39
 Id.  
40
 Id.  
41
 See sources cited supra note 11. 
42
 Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 123, Fin. Acct. Series (revised Dec. 2004), accessible at 
http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Document_C/DocumentPage?cid=1218220124271&acceptedDisclaimer=true.   
43
 Id. 
44
 Cox, supra note 33 (describing the requirements of 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(c)).  
45
 See 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(b), § 229.402(s) (requiring a “Compensation Discussion and Analysis” section, 
consisting of “material information that is necessary to an understanding of the [company’]s compensation policies 
and decisions regarding [the executive officers falling within the scope of the rule]”). 
46
 Cox, supra note 33. 
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In addition, in 2007, the SEC enacted rules requiring full disclosure of all aspects of 
executive and director pay and benefits, including stock options.  These rules require the 
company to disclose the full amount of an executive’s compensation in a single number, and 
whether a stock option was backdated.
47
  If the stock option is backdated, the corporation must 
provide the reason why.  The goal of the rule is to make executive compensation more 
transparent to the shareholders.   
 
In the wake of the 2006 backdating scandal, many corporations began to award their 
employee option grants at scheduled times each year.
48
  This practice, has given rise to other 
forms of options manipulation, as described below. Whether these reforms have finally stopped 
the practice of backdating and other timing games is the subject of our current study. 
 
 
B. Manipulation of Exercise Date 
 
There is evidence that some executives have changed the exercise date of their options, 
without disclosure thereby decreasing their tax liability.
49
  By backdating the exercise date to a 
date with a lower stock price, executives can transform regular income into capital gains and 
receive the benefits of a significantly lower marginal tax rate.
50
 
 
C. Spring-Loading and Bullet-Dodging 
 
The most frequently discussed form of option timing manipulation, other than 
backdating, is “spring-loading:” timing stock option awards to occur just before a positive public 
announcement by the company.
51
  The positive announcement increases the value of the stock, 
resulting in a “windfall” gain for the recipients of the stock options.52  This theory was first put 
forward by Professor David Yermack, who examined a sample of 620 stock option awards to 
CEOs of Fortune 500 companies between 1992 and 1994.
53
  He found that the average abnormal 
increase in option award value after 20 trading days was $30,000 and $48,900 after 50 trading 
days.
54
 
 
In contrast, executives who engage in bullet-dodging are awarded stock options following 
a negative public announcement.  The negative information may cause a temporary reduction in 
                                                     
47
 SEC, Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, Release Nos. 33-8732A, 34-54302A, IC-27444A, 
17-18, https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2006/33-8732a.pdf.  
48
 Daines et al. supra note 25.  
49
 Mark Maremont & Charles Forelle, How Backdating Helped Executives Cut Their Taxes, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 12, 
2006), A1, A13.  See also S. Burcu Avci, et al., Timing of Gifts of Common Stock by Corporate Executives , Pa. J. 
Bus. L.(forthcoming) ) (analyzing timing games of gifts of common stock by executives to increase their tax 
deductions). 
50
 JAMES M. BICKLEY & GARY SHORTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33926, STOCK OPTIONS: THE BACKDATING 
ISSUE 28 (2008). 
51
 Id. 
52
 Id. 
53
 Yermack, supra note 18, at 449. 
54
 Id. at 458. 
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the market value of the stock, resulting in stock option grants at a low price.
55
 If the stock 
subsequently restores to its pre-announcement value, recipients of these stock options would 
have benefited from a favorable exercise price.
56
  
 
Spring-loading and bullet-dodging have been empirically observed in the timing of 
option repricing.
57
  A statistical analysis of 236 option re-pricings for 166 companies between 
1992 and 1997 suggested that executives who expected positive earnings reports repriced their 
option before the announcement, and alternatively, managers who expected negative earnings 
reports repriced their options after the announcement of the report.
58
 
 
D.  Manipulation of Information Release 
 
SOX, SEC regulations, and increasing public scrutiny curbed the practice of options 
backdating, to a large extent. But the problem has not been completely resolved. As noted above, 
many firms began to award options on a specific schedule every year to avoid allegations of 
illegal options backdating.  In 2003, it was found that about 60 percent of all CEO option grants 
were scheduled.
59
 Although this eradicated most instances of backdating, it has resulted in other 
agency problems.  Executives who know about the upcoming option grants have “an incentive to 
temporarily depress stock prices before the grant dates to get options with lower strike prices.”60 
CEOs may use various mechanisms to distort the strike price, such as by changing the substance 
and/or timing of the company’s disclosures.61  
  
Substantively, the manipulation of information flow around fixed option grant dates does 
not diverge very much from spring-loading and bullet-dodging.  In spring-loading and bullet-
dodging, information flow is fixed but option dates are variable; manipulation of information 
flow involves variable information flow and fixed option dates, to the same effect.  
 
When the dates for stock option grants are fixed, the timing of corporate announcements 
can be manipulated in relation to known dates for the granting of options. Executives may induce 
or accelerate the release of bad news before option grant date in order to set a lower strike price 
for the options–analogous to bullet-dodging.62  The executive could also delay the release of 
                                                     
55
 BICKLEY & SHORTER, supra note 50, at 28. 
56
 Id. 
57
 Some companies reprice executive stock options if the exercise price of the options falls significantly below the 
market value of the company’s stock. This is done in order to restore employee incentives. Id.  
58
 Id. (discussing the findings in Sandra Renfro Callaghan, P. Jane Saly & Chandra Subramaniam., The Timing of 
Option Repricing, 59 J. FIN. 1651-1676 (2004)). 
59
 Daines et al. supra note 25, at 4.  
60
 Id. 
61
 Id.  
62
 See Chauvin & Shenoy, supra note 20. The authors statistically analyzed a sample of 783 stock option grants from 
May 1991 to February 1994 issued to 209 CEOs and found “a significant stock price decrease prior to executive 
stock option grants.” Id. See also Aboody & Kasznik, supra note 20, at 73. The authors investigated the hypothesis 
“that CEOs manage investors’ expectations around award dates by delaying good news and rushing forward bad 
news.” Id. at 98. They analyzed 2,039 stock option grants between 1992 and 1996 to the CEOs of over 500 firms 
and concluded that “CEOs of firms with scheduled awards make opportunistic voluntary disclosures that maximize 
their stock option compensation. Id. 
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good news until after the grant is made – analogous to spring-loading.63 Thus, for purposes of 
our study, we include manipulation of information flow as an aspect of spring-loading and 
bullet-dodging.  Additionally, the executive could delay projects until after an options grant, or 
otherwise manipulate the timing of the corporation’s investments.64 An executive may also 
change the firm’s profit trajectory or accounting options to move earnings from before the grant 
to after.
65
  All these actions transfer wealth from the shareholders to management and may 
impact the corporation’s value by influencing investment choices.66  
 
Empirical evidence suggests that to manage investors’ expectations around fixed dates of 
scheduled awards for their stock options, management may delay good news and accelerate the 
release of bad news.
67
  The bad news may be disclosed in a public announcement, or managers 
may “put a more negative ‘spin’ on information than otherwise, speak ‘off the record’ to 
analysts, or strategically use rumor and innuendo to ‘leak’ information.”68  
 
Evidencing this behavior, the data shows “abnormal stock returns surrounding SEC Form 
8-K filings (which report material corporate events) tend to be negative in the months 
immediately before a scheduled CEO option grant and then positive in the months after the 
grant.”69  Executives also tend to move earnings to after the grant period.  Scholars have found 
that scheduled options may result in executives making disclosures, accounting, and investment 
decisions based on their own self-interest rather than increasing shareholder value.
70
  These 
actions may be even worse than backdating because they distort stock prices and may decrease 
firm value if significant projects are postponed as a result.
71
  Unlike the backdating practice 
which has been mostly curbed, this is an ongoing concern.  
 
Empirical research has also demonstrated that corporations with scheduled options tend 
to show the same pattern associated with backdating.
72
  This pattern was not found in grants 
made prior to the SEC’s 2002 regulations.73  CEOs with significant compensation in scheduled 
options have more incentive to disrupt the company’s stock price and research shows they have 
earned an average three percent abnormal return on the option.
74
  This trend is even more 
striking the more options the CEO holds and the more difficult the corporation is to value.
75
 
 
Our empirical study, described in Part II below, provides further evidence of this practice 
and adds valuable current data.  Most studies on the topic of stock option grant manipulation in 
executive compensation have focused primarily on pre-2006 backdating of stock options.  Once 
the excitement of the backdating scandal simmered, and the regulatory changes of the early 
                                                     
63
 Daines et al. supra note 25, at 4. 
64
 Id. 
65
 Id.  
66
 Id. at 5.  
67
 Chauvin & Shenoy, supra note 20, at 59. See also Aboody & Kasznik, supra note 20, at 74. 
68
 BICKLEY & SHORTER, supra note 50, at 37 (citing Chauvin & Shenoy, supra note 20, at 59).  
69
 Daines et al. supra note 25, at 5.  
70
 Id. at 7.  
71
 Id. at 8. 
72
 Id.  
73
 Id. See also Heron & Lie, What Fraction, supra note 25.   
74
 Daines et al. supra note 25, at 6. 
75
  Id. 
10 
 
2000s were implemented, research turned to the other forms of manipulation (i.e. spring-loading 
and bullet-dodging).  Even now, however, there is very limited research on these topics 
analyzing information in the last decade, after these important regulatory changes took effect.  
Our research adds to the empirical studies on the issues of stock option grant manipulation, with 
a more comprehensive dataset than previous studies.  Importantly, as we look at the period 
between 2008 and 2014, our information encompasses the effects of the regulatory changes of 
the mid- and late-2000s, concluding that these changes have not prevented the unfair 
manipulation of stock option grants.  Notably, as our earliest data is in 2008, our evidence is not 
explained by backdating of options.  Finally, our study takes prior studies further by considering 
manipulation of data flow around scheduled grants as well as
 
manipulation of grant dates.
76
   
 
Spring-loading and bullet-dodging in the context of executive stock options are difficult 
to address because the tactics employed may differ year to year.  Executives could make strategic 
disclosures, use accruals, or act in a number of different ways to impact stock price.
77
  It is also 
easy to rationalize and justify the timing of disclosures because executives are given discretion 
about these decisions.
78
  
 
To reduce the risk of this type of distortion, scholars have suggested that boards and 
analysts stay aware of the incentives established by scheduled options and closely monitor 
disclosures.
79
  Furthermore, it has been suggested that boards decouple stock and exercise prices, 
as well as spread out at-the-money option grants over months to dilute the size of the grant per 
period.
80
  In addition, the directors could set the strike price at an average of stock prices over a 
period, restrict the period of time in which executives can sell stock to the month the options are 
granted, and/or give officer and directors options at separate times from the CEO.
81
  We further 
suggest regulatory changes to close the opportunities giving rise to these manipulative behaviors 
by requiring options awards to be awarded on a pro-rata daily basis, as discussed in Part V 
below. 
 
 
II. Current State of Options Manipulation:  The Empirical Evidence 
 
A. Hypotheses and Data 
 
This section presents our hypotheses, methodology, and empirical findings relating to 
executive behavior with regard to stock option manipulation.  We show that manipulative 
behavior continues despite the aftermath of the backdating scandal and the corresponding 
heightened disclosure requirements.  
 
                                                     
76
 See Part II.A., infra. 
77
 Daines et al. supra note 25, at 44. 
78
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79
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80
 Id. at 42 (citing Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Paying for Long-term Performance, 159 U. PENN. L. REV 
1915-1959 (2010)). 
81
 Id. at 42.  
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Following the work of Professors Narayanan and Seyhun,
82
 we investigate two 
hypotheses involving dating and timing games.  Our first hypothesis is that executives are 
continuing to backdate option grant dates (the backdating hypothesis).  Our second hypothesis, 
denoted the timing hypotheses, is linked to spring-loading and bullet-dodging activities.  We thus 
analyze whether executives continue to manipulate either the dating of their options and/or the 
flow of information to increase their compensation.   
 
These hypotheses can be tested empirically.  First, our backdating hypothesis suggests 
that if executives change the date of their option awards to an earlier date resulting in a higher 
compensation award, then these awards will necessarily appear to be reported with delays.  
Furthermore, the greater the reporting delay, the greater will be the level of unfair compensation.   
 
To explain this further, an example may be useful.  Suppose that executives receive an 
option award on March 2, when the stock price is $50.  This implies that without backdating the 
exercise price of the option would have been set at $50.  Also suppose that the stock price started 
about $50 per share and over the past year began to rise, before it fell to $25 on January 2, and 
then increased back to $50 at the time of executive option award.  In order to maximize their 
compensation, suppose that executives backdate their option award to January 2
nd
 and they report 
that they received their option award on January 2 when the stock price was $25.  Executives 
then immediately report their option award on Form 4 to the SEC without any further delays.   
 
At this point, anyone examining Form 4 who is unaware of the fraud committed by the 
executive will deduce the following:  1) executives received an option award on January 2
nd
 
when the stock price was $25; and 2) executives reported this award on March 2
nd
 with a two 
month delay.   
 
Thus, to the extent executives go back into stock price history and backdate their option 
awards, these awards will be necessarily associated with reporting delays.  Furthermore, to the 
extent executives go further back into history to find even lower stock prices in the past, those 
with greater delays will have higher price rises (ex-post).  Thus, the greater the reporting delays, 
the greater will be the degree of compensation. 
 
The timing hypotheses, on the other hand, do not necessarily imply reporting delays.  
Here, managers do not change the option grant date, rather they change the date the information 
is publicly revealed.  In spring-loading, executives with good information, delay its release until 
after their options are granted.  In bullet-dodging, executives with negative information 
accelerate the release of information to a date before their options will be granted.  These actions 
have the effect of minimizing the stock price on the option grant date.  Consequently, the 
exercise price of the options is also minimized, thereby increasing the compensation to the 
executives.   
 
To test these hypotheses, we obtain option grant data.  Our data comes from the Thomson 
Reuters database and contains all option grants to executives in all publicly listed firms in the 
United States.  The database includes the date of the grant, the reporting date, number of shares 
granted, and underlying security on which options are granted, in addition to firm name, firm 
                                                     
82
 Narayanan & Seyhun, supra note 11, at 1907. 
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identification information, and the executive’s name and title.  Although the database starts in 
1986, we limit our attention to the January 1, 2008 to December 31, 2014 period to contrast from 
previously documented evidence of abuse.  Our main objective is to understand whether 
executives continue to abuse their privilege and manipulate their option grants to unfairly 
increase their compensation.    
 
Table 1 provides sample characteristics of executive option grants by firm size. Option 
grants are grouped into three firm-size categories. Firm size is measured as market capitalization 
of firms (number of shares outstanding multiplied by stock price per share). The first group 
contains stocks with less than $1 billion market capitalization, we call this group small-cap firms 
(3,574 firms). The second group, mid-cap firms, contains stocks with market capitalization 
between $1 billion and $5 billion (926 firms). The largest firm size group contains stocks with 
more than $5 billion market capitalization; we call this group large-cap firms (375 firms).  
 
Table 1 
Sample Characteristics of Executives' Option Grants, 1/1/2008-12/31/2014 
 Firm Size 
Small- Cap 
Firms 
Mid-Cap 
Firms 
Large-Cap 
Firms 
All  firms 
 Firm Definition 
Market 
Capitalization  
is less than 
$1 Billion 
Market 
Capitalization  
is between $1 
Billion and 
$5 Billion 
Market 
Capitalization  
is more than 
$5 Billion 
 
  Executive Option Awards 
  
    
Number of Firms 3,574 926 375 4,875 
  
    
Number of Option Awards 964,175 251,404 143,176 1,358,755 
  
    
Average Award Size (Number of shares) 11,907.9 18,272.3 25,389.1 14,506.0 
  
    
Total Awards to Officers (million shares) 3,976.34 2,581.24 1,313.73 7,871.31 
  
    
Total Awards to  Directors (million shares) 2,550.87 927.64 1,101.62 4,580.13 
  
    
Total Awards to Top Executives (million 
shares) 
4,954.09 1,084.86 1,219.77 7,258.71 
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Each individual grant is an observation and the dataset includes a total of 1,358,755 
option grants.  Table 1 shows that options are granted mostly by small-cap firms. The number of 
companies and the number of awards are highest for small-cap firms and lowest for large-cap 
firms. Small-cap firms granted 964,175 separate awards to managers, while mid-cap and large-
cap firms granted 251,404 and 143,176 separate awards to managers, respectively.  
 
The average award size is positively related to firm size:  large-cap firms grant the largest 
awards to their managers.  The average award size is 25,389.15 shares for large-cap firms.  For 
small and mid-cap firms, the average award size is 11,908 and 18,272 shares, respectively. The 
average total shares awarded also rises with firm size:  in small-cap firms, the average total 
shares awarded equals 3.2 million shares.  This value rises to 5.0 million and 9.7 million shares 
for mid-cap and large-cap firms, respectively.   
 
 Overall, our sample contains about 20 billion share awards. This is distributed as 11.5 
billion in small-cap firms, 4.6 billion in mid-cap firms and 3.6 billion in large-cap firms.   
 
We use event-study methodology as described below to measure the abnormal returns 
around event dates. Event dates are defined as option grant dates.  We measure 90 days of 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) before the event date and 90 days of cumulative abnormal 
returns after the event date.  
 
To explore whether executives still time their options, we compute abnormal returns by 
subtracting the return to the value weighted index of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), 
American Stock Exchange (AMEX) and the National Association of Securities Dealers 
Automated Quotations (NASDAQ) stocks from the returns for firms with the option awards to 
executives.  This approach controls for market movements and implicitly assumes that average 
beta or risk-exposure is one.  Given that our sample contains over 9,000 firms, this assumption is 
satisfied.  Hence, abnormal return ARi,t for stock i and day t is computed as:  
 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = (𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚𝑡)               for each firm i and day t,         
 
where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the simple daily return on the stock option i awarded to insiders on day t. 𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the 
daily return to the value-weighted index of NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks on day t.   For 
each event date t, these returns are first averaged across all option granting firms i to compute 
average abnormal returns:   
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡 =
1
𝑛𝑡
∑𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑛𝑡
𝑖=1
 
The average abnormal returns are then cumulated across the event dates as follows: 
 
Average number shares awarded per firm 
(million shares) 
3.21 4.96 9.69 4.04 
  
    
Total Shares Awarded (in Million) 11,481.30 4,593.74 3,635.12 19,710.15 
14 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑇 =∑𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
 
 
 
These cumulative abnormal returns are then graphed to examine the behavior of abnormal 
returns around gifting dates. 
  
Figure 1 shows the overall pattern of abnormal returns.  Stock returns are relatively flat 
until about day -30 (30 trading days before the option grant date).  From that point they begin to 
increase.  During the 90 days following the option grant date, stock prices rise abnormally by 
more than 6%.  This finding establishes that executives are still timing their option awards.   
 
 
  
 
Figure 1:  Cumulative abnormal returns around executives’ option grant dates.  Abnormal 
returns are computed using market adjusted model.  Day 0 refers to the grant day.  Day 10 refers 
to the 10
th
 trading day after the grant date, while day -10 refers to the tenth trading day before the 
grant date.  Executives have the title of CEO, CFO, CI, CO, CT, President, Chairman of the 
Board, Director, Officer, Vice President, Vice Chair and members of the various board 
committees. 
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Figure 1: Cumulative abnormal returns around option grant days 
All Option grants
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Next we examine abnormal stock returns grouped by the number of shares granted.  
These results are shown in Figure 2.  First, Figure 2 shows that post-grant abnormal returns line 
up positively with shares granted.  The largest share-grant group has the largest post-grant 
abnormal returns, while the smallest share-grant group has the smallest post-grant abnormal 
returns.  For the small share-grant group (1000 shares or fewer) the abnormal returns reach about 
2%.  This value jumps to 4% for the middle group (between 1,000 and 500,000 shares granted) 
and about 9% for the largest grant-size group (more than 5000,000 shares granted).  These 
findings further corroborate the conclusion that the post-grant returns are not due to random 
noise.  Instead, this evidence indicates very clearly that the greater the benefits to executives 
(greater shares granted), the greater is the manipulation of stock returns.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 2:  Cumulative abnormal returns around executives’ option grant dates.  Abnormal 
returns are computed using market adjusted model.  Day 0 refers to the grant day.  Day 10 refers 
to the 10
th
 trading day after the grant date, while day -10 refers to the tenth trading day before the 
grant date.  Executives have the title of CEO, CFO, CI, CO, CT, President, Chairman of the 
Board, Director, Officer, Vice President, Vice Chair and members of the various board 
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Figure 2:   
Cumulative abnormal returns around option grant days, by grant 
size 
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committees. 
 
Next we examine the abnormal stock return patterns grouped by the relation of the 
executives.  Figure 3 displays 180 days of abnormal returns around grant date for officers, 
directors, and top executives.
83
  One hypothesis is that because top executives have access to all 
private information about the company, they should have the most ability to influence stock 
prices.  Another hypothesis is that manipulations originate from the board of directors.  Using 
this logic, directors’ options should show the largest evidence of manipulations.  The evidence 
shown in Figure 3 however indicates the stock price patterns are the same for all three groups.    
This finding indicates that options are typically granted on the same day to all executives and 
directors, and thus it is not possible to distinguish between subgroups of insiders.   
 
 
                                                     
83
 We define top executives to include CEOs, CFOs, CI, CO, CT, Chairmen of the Board, Presidents, officers and 
owners of more than 10% of the outstanding shares.    
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Figure 3:  Cumulative abnormal returns around executives’ option grant dates.  Abnormal 
returns are computed using market adjusted model.  Day 0 refers to the grant day.  Day 10 refers 
to the 10
th
 trading day after the grant date, while day -10 refers to the tenth trading day before the 
grant date.  Executives have the title of CEO, CFO, CI, CO, CT, President, Chairman of the 
Board, Director, Officer, Vice President, Vice Chair and members of the various board 
committees.  Top executives include CEO, CFO, CI, CO, CT, President, and Chairman of the 
Board, 
 
Next we examine the manipulation of option awards for scheduled and unscheduled 
awards.  Managers’ ability to influence stock prices on the grant or exercise date is limited for 
scheduled awards. Managers can influence the stock price of a scheduled award only if they have 
timely and relevant information before the scheduled date. They can release the good news after 
the grant date or release the bad news before the grant date.  To the contrary, it is easier for 
managers to influence the stock price of an unscheduled award. However, if executives backdate 
their options, they can backdate all options with equal ease, regardless of the scheduled or 
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Cumulative abnormal returns around option grant days, by 
Relation 
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unscheduled status. 
 
Figure 4 shows the 180 day abnormal returns around the grant date for scheduled and 
unscheduled awards.  An award is defined as scheduled if there is another grant within plus or 
minus two days of the prior calendar year.  Otherwise, the grant is defined as unscheduled. 
Figure 4 shows that the average abnormal returns are the same for scheduled and unscheduled 
awards.  This finding suggests that executives use a variety of manipulative games to time the 
stock option grants.   
 
The evidence in Figure 4 thus suggests that manipulation involves more than timing 
games.   Yet, if some of the option grants are backdated, these price patterns would be possible 
for both scheduled as well as unscheduled awards.  Next we examine the evidence for potential 
backdating of executive options. 
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Figure 4:  Cumulative abnormal returns around executives’ option grant dates.  Abnormal 
returns are computed using market adjusted model.  Day 0 refers to the grant day.  Day 10 refers 
to the 10
th
 trading day after the grant date, while day -10 refers to the tenth trading day before the 
grant date.  Executives have the title of CEO, CFO, CI, CO, CT, President, Chairman of the 
Board, Director, Officer, Vice President, Vice Chair and members of the various board 
committees.  Scheduled awards are preceded by another option award 365 days before plus or 
minus two days.   
 
An empirical implication of the backdating hypothesis is that options with greater 
reporting delays should show greater evidence of manipulation.  To examine this issue we group 
option grants by reporting delays in Figure 5.   About 1.2 million option grants are reported 
within the two business days as required by SOX.  In contrast, 77,173 are reported between 3 and 
10 days later, 38,505 are reported between 10 to 60 days later and finally, 23,290 option grants 
are reported more than 60 days later.  These approximately 140,000 options (about 10% of the 
total) that are reported late are in direct violation of the reporting requirements of SOX. 
 
Figure 5 also shows that stock returns rise about 6% following timely reported option 
grants.  The corresponding abnormal return is a little smaller for options with delays up to 60 
days, as they average between 4% and 5%.  However, for options reported with more than a 60-
day delay, the abnormal returns rise to about 8%.  This evidence is consistent with the conclusion 
that at least some of the options could still be backdated. 
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Figure 5:  Cumulative abnormal returns around option grant 
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Figure 5:  Cumulative abnormal returns around executives’ option grant dates.  Abnormal 
returns are computed using market adjusted model.  Day 0 refers to the grant day.  Day 10 refers 
to the 10
th
 trading day after the grant date, while day -10 refers to the tenth trading day before the 
grant date.  Executives have the title of CEO, CFO, CI, CO, CT, President, Chairman of the 
Board, Director, Officer, Vice President, Vice Chair and members of the various board 
committees.  Reporting delays are measured from the grant date to the SEC receipt date.     
 
As an additional test of backdating, we also classify the options by the abnormal stock 
returns around the grant date.  Since backdating involves picking a date with the lowest stock 
price, we group options into two categories, one group showing an abnormal stock price decline 
10 days before the grant date, and the other showing an abnormal stock price increase during the 
10 days before the grant date.  The backdating hypothesis predicts that the group with a stock 
price decline should show a greater subsequent rise in stock price.   
 
The evidence is shown in Figure 6.  Consistent with the backdating hypothesis, the group 
with a prior 10-day stock price drop shows about a 7% rise during the next 90 days.  In contrast, 
the group with a prior 10-day stock price increase before the grant date shows only a 5% increase 
during the next 90 days.  Once again, this evidence corroborates the finding that at least some 
options grants are still being backdated. 
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Figure 6:  Cumulative abnormal returns around executives’ option grant dates.  Abnormal 
returns are computed using market adjusted model.  Day 0 refers to the grant day.  Day 10 refers 
to the 10
th
 trading day after the grant date, while day -10 refers to the tenth trading day before the 
grant date.  Executives have the title of CEO, CFO, CI, CO, CT, President, Chairman of the 
Board, Director, Officer, Vice President, Vice Chair and members of the various board 
committees.  If the 10 day cumulative abnormal return from day -10 to day -1 is positive, then 
prior return is classified as “Up.”   If the 10 day cumulative abnormal return from day -10 to day 
-1 is negative, then prior return is classified as “Down.”   
 
Overall, the evidence presented in this section indicates that option grants are still being 
manipulated.  Abnormal stock returns rise about 6% during the 90 days following the option 
grants.   Large volume grants show a greater amount of manipulation.  Similarly, late reported 
option grants also show a greater amount of subsequent abnormal returns consistent with 
backdating.  Option grants where stock price drops during the 10-days before the grant date show 
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Cumulative abnormal returns around option grant days, by Prior 
10-day Abnormal Stock Returns 
Up Down
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a large bounce back after the grant date.  This evidence is consistent with both timing and 
backdating games. 
 
 
 
III. Federal Securities Laws Implicated in Stock Option Manipulations 
 
Section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934 makes it illegal for anyone to “use or employ, 
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities 
exchange or any security not so registered, . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or 
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe.”84  
Under SEC Rule 10b-5, it is unlawful for anyone “(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice 
to defraud, (b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they 
were made, not misleading, or (c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which 
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,” in connection with a purchase 
or sale of securities.
85
  
 
To establish a violation of these federal securities laws, the SEC must show that there 
was “(1) a material misrepresentation, (2) connection with the purchase or sale of a security, (3) 
scienter, and (4) use of the jurisdictional means.”86  Material misrepresentation exists where 
there is “a substantial likelihood that the disclosure … would have been viewed by the 
reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made 
available.”87  The determination of the materiality depends on both questions of law and fact.88  
Courts entertain factors such as whether the disclosure in question impacted stock price,
89
 as well 
as the degree to which the earnings or losses were misstated.
90
  The SEC has resisted establishing 
a quantitative standard for determining materiality
91
 and emphasized qualitative factors, such as 
the intent of the misstatement or omission, in the analysis.
92
  
 
A.  Options Backdating and Forward-Dating 
 
Between 2003 and 2010, the SEC brought charges against 32 companies and/or their 
executives for options backdating.
93
 Upon discovery of options backdating, corporations may be 
                                                     
84
 15 U.S.C. § 78j. 
85
 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. 
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 SEC v. C. Jones &Co., 312 F. Supp. 2d 1375, 1379 (D. Colo. 2004).  
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 In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1424-25 (3
rd
 Cir. 1997).  
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 Narayanan et al. supra note 4, at 1608.  
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 The Second Circuit adopted the SEC’s 1999 Staff Accounting Bulletin in dismissing quantitative benchmarks in 
Ganino v. Citizens Utilities Co. (228 F.3d 154, 163-64 (2
nd
 Cir. 2000)) (stating SEC staff accounting bulletins are “a 
body of experience and informed judgment” (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140), well-reasoned,  
and consistent with law.) 
92
 Narayanan et al. supra note 4, at 15 (citing SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45, 150, 45, 150 
(1999)).  
93
 The SEC charged the following companies and/or their officers/directors in the following chronological order: 
Peregrine Systems, Inc. (June 30, 2003); Symbol Technologies, Inc. (June 3, 2004) (resulting in a $37 million fine 
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required to restate financial statements and could face significant penalties.  The board of 
directors may also be implicated in this wrongdoing, particularly if they knew or should have 
known about the practice.
94
  The former CFO and member of the board of Brocade 
Communication Systems, Inc. (Brocade), for example, was implicated under allegations that he 
had knowledge of the practice and did not address it.
95
  
 
Undisclosed options backdating and forward-dating violate §10(b) of Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934
96
 and SEC Rule 10b-5.
97
   First, undisclosed backdating and forward-
dating satisfy the material misrepresentation requirement.  It is likely that a reasonable investor 
would find this information to be significant in making investment decisions, especially because 
executive compensation is a major focus for shareholders.
98
  When backdating and forward-
dating ensues, corporate financial statements are inaccurate and tax laws are violated.
99
  
 
In its first action in 2003, for example, the SEC alleged that Peregrine Systems, Inc. 
understated its expenses by about $90 million, when it “fail[ed] to record any expense for 
compensation when it issued incentive stock options.”100  Next, the SEC charged Symbol 
Technologies, Inc. for manipulating exercise dates of stock options at the cost of $229 million.
101
 
In one prominent case, the SEC required Brocade to restate six years of financial statements.
102
 
The civil fraud action filed by the SEC against three former executives of Brocade alleged that 
the backdating of stock options caused the inflation of the company’s net income by 
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approximately $1 billion in just 2001.
103
  Even when the amount has a minor effect on financial 
statements, research shows that it has a significant impact on shareholder earnings.
104
 
 
Second, the fraud must have occurred in connection with the purchase or sale of 
securities.  This requirement is met when the “scheme to defraud and the sale of securities 
coincide.”105 The courts consider press releases, quarterly reports, or any documents that 
investors may rely on as evidence.
106
  Because backdating of stock options almost always results 
in misrepresentations in financial statements, the element can generally be satisfied.
107
  
 
In its most recent charges for option backdating, the SEC charged Trident Microsystems 
and the company’s former CEO and CAO with stock option backdating in 2010.108 The SEC 
alleged that executives in the corporation backdated stock options from at least 1993 to May 
2006, thereby, concealing millions of dollars in expenses from its shareholders. The company 
filed a restatement in 2007 showing about $37 million in compensation expenses that were not 
accurately recorded with the SEC over a thirteen year period.
109
  By not accounting for these 
grants, Trident overstated its pre-tax income by as much as 113 percent in each fiscal year during 
the period.
110
  
 
The third element requires that the defendant had “a mental state embracing intent to 
deceive, manipulate, or defraud.”111  The standard for meeting this requirement varies depending 
on the jurisdiction.  The Ninth Circuit, for example, requires “deliberate recklessness” or conduct 
that shows “extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care, and which presents a danger 
of misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to the defendant or is so obvious that the 
actor must have been aware of it.”112 As with the previous elements, the third element is fairly 
easily satisfied with options backdating practice due to the deception inherent in changing the 
date of a previously granted stock option.
113
  The mental state required by this third element 
would not be present, however, in cases of simple procedural mistake.
114
  
 
The last element mandates that the fraud is conducted “by the use of any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails.”115 This element is also easily satisfied, 
as it requires a link to either mail or interstate commerce, which the courts have historically 
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interpreted very broadly.
116
 Importantly, the SEC filing required of executive compensation 
plans “satisfies the jurisdictional means requirement.”117 
 
 
 B.  Spring-Loading  
 
The legality of spring-loading under Rule 10(b)(5) has been hotly debated.
118
  Even the 
SEC Commissioners do not agree on whether spring-loading should be considered a violation of 
insider trading laws.
119
  SEC Commissioner Paul Atkins argued that it is unclear if “there is a 
legitimate legal rationale for pursuing any theory of insider trading in connection with option 
grants.”120 Former SEC Chief Accountant Lynn Turner, on the other hand, has testified that non-
disclosure of spring-loading is a “false and misleading” statement in the context of securities 
laws.
121
  In addition, former Chairman Christopher Cox has remarked that the Commission is just 
as “concerned with misbehavior in using inside information to time the granting of options” as 
with backdating and expressed interest in the practice of spring-loading.
122
  The SEC’s approach 
is further complicated by its initial pursuit of Analog Devices, Inc. for spring-loading, where the 
Commission alleged the company “failed to adequately disclose that it priced stock options 
before the release of favorable financial results.”123  Although the initial investigation and 
complaint included both backdating and spring-loading allegations, the settlement for $3 million 
only addressed backdating. The SEC reportedly did not charge the company with spring-loading 
because the conduct in question took place prior to the adoption of the 2006 express disclosure 
rules.
124
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These 2006 SEC disclosure requirements also do not take a position on spring-loading. 
The SEC’s release adopting the final rules in August 2006 states:  
 
The Commission does not express a view as to whether or not a company may or 
may not have valid and sufficient reasons for such timing of option grants, 
consistent with a company’s own business purposes.  Some commentators have 
expressed the view that following these practices may enable a company to 
receive more benefit from the incentive or retention effect of options because 
recipients may value options granted in this manner more highly or because doing 
so provides an immediate incentive for employee retention because an employee 
who leaves the company forfeits the potential value of unvested, in-the-money 
options.  Other commentators believe that timing option grants in connection with 
the release of material non-public information may unfairly benefit executives and 
employees.
125
 
 
The current rules simply require disclosure that a company grants stock options when in 
possession of material nonpublic information, rather than the disclosure of that information.
126
 
Yet, we argue spring-loading and the practice of manipulating information flow to convert at-
the-money options into in-the-money options violates at least the spirit of § 10(b) of the 
Securities Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5, if not the statute and the rule, and is contrary to the 
congressional intent behind federal securities regulation.  We further argue in Part IV that such 
self-interested manipulation of information flow also violates state fiduciary duty laws. 
 
Although the SEC has not taken a clear stand on the issue, the legality or illegality of 
spring-loading, specifically relating to insider trading rules, has been debated by scholars. 
Professor Iman Anabtawi, for example, argues that spring-loaded options can be considered as 
discounted options.
127
 She states that “granting a stock option with an exercise price that does not 
reflect favorable inside information is substantively equivalent to granting a discount option; that 
is, an option with an exercise price below the market price on the date of the grant. The upward 
price adjustment that results from the release of the inside information is the size of the 
discount.”128  Therefore, spring-loading and backdating may be different in form, but are largely 
the same in substance.
129
 Anabtawi further argues that “[w]hile it is true that using discount 
options may be efficient compensation policy, doing so without adequate disclosure to 
shareholders involves making materially misleading statements in connection with a securities 
transaction − in other words insider trading.”130  
 
The purpose and policy considerations of § 10(b), which will be discussed in greater detail 
below, strongly weigh in favor of making the grant of spring-loaded options a disclosure-
inducing event.  
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  1.  Disclosure requirements 
 
Executive compensation reporting requirements promulgated by the SEC in 2006, 
mandate that a company disclose “all material elements of . . . compensation of . . . named 
executive officers.” 131   The material elements may include "[h]ow the determination is made as 
to when awards are granted, including awards of equity-based compensation such as options.”132  
Although these disclosure requirements appear broad, the release adopting the final rules 
expressly states that the SEC takes no position on whether a company has “valid and sufficient 
reasons” for “timing option grants in connection with the release of material non-public 
information,” and would require only the “plan or practice” of spring-loading or bullet-dodging 
be disclosed.
133
 While remarking that a spring-loading plan “would be material to investors and 
thus should be fully disclosed,” the SEC only requires that “the company should disclose that the 
board of directors or compensation committee may grant options at times when the board or 
committee is in possession of material non-public information.”134  Thus, even the more strict 
disclosure rules only require a company that grants stock options while in possession of material 
nonpublic information to disclose that fact to its shareholders.
135
 
 
Yet, the federal courts have articulated a “disclose or abstain rule” under Rule 10b-5, 
which establishes that an insider holding material nonpublic information must either disclose this 
information before trading or not trade until the information has been released to the public.
136
 
The case that provides the strongest precedent for the illegality of manipulation of information 
flow and spring-loading is SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.
137
 In this case, the defendants, 
company executives, possessed material inside information that their company had found 
valuable mineral deposits in Canada.
138
  While knowing of this new discovery, the defendants 
accepted stock option grants from an unknowing board of directors.
139
 After the company made a 
public announcement of discovery, the corporate stock price soared, increasing by over 140 
percent from the date of the stock options grant.
140
 According to the Texas Gulf Sulphur court, in 
order to comply with Rule 10b-5, the option recipients would have either had to disclose the 
inside information in their possession to the company’s stock option committee or reject the 
options.
141
  The executives failed to make the required disclosure, and the court rescinded the 
option grants.
142
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Texas Gulf Sulphur provides an early articulation of the “disclose or abstain rule,” which 
forms the basis of classical insider trading theory
143
 and requires that “an insider possessing 
material inside information must either disclose such information prior to trading or abstain from 
trading until the information has been disclosed.”144 This rule was initially based on the ground 
that all members of the open market were “entitled to equal access to material information.”145 
The Supreme Court, however, later limited the scope of the rule.  In Chiarella v. United 
States,
146
 the Court adopted the SEC’s argument from In re Cady, Roberts & Co.147 and held that 
the defendant must have an established duty arising from a “fiduciary or other similar relation of 
trust and confidence” before the “disclose or abstain” rule applies.148  The Court further 
confirmed this requirement in Dirks v. SEC.
149
 
 
The question then arises as to whether, by spring-loading and manipulating the timing of 
information flow, executives and directors might be in breach of a pre-existing duty.  Under 
Dirks, not every breach of fiduciary duty in relation to a securities transaction is a violation of 
Rule 10b-5;
150
 the breach must come from “some manipulation or deception.”151 Dirks followed 
Santa Fe Industries v. Green, which held that only conduct that “can be fairly viewed as 
‘manipulative or deceptive’ within the meaning of [Section 10(b)]” could be the source of 
liability.
152
 
 
The Supreme Court has not clarified the source of the fiduciary duty within the context of 
federal securities law.
153
  In fact, the Court explicitly argued against a federal common law 
fiduciary duty in Santa Fe, as it would “bring within [Rule 10b-5] a wide variety of corporate 
conduct traditionally left to state regulation.”154 Despite this reluctance, however, the Court has 
implied a federal source of the fiduciary obligation in key cases following Santa Fe.
155
 
 
Professor Anabtawi argues that the difficulty is in determining whether spring-loading 
satisfies the “fraud or deception” element as the source of the fiduciary duty is uncertain.156 The 
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courts have held that the “fraud or deceit” element is satisfied by evidence of material 
misrepresentation on the part of the defendants.
157
  The information that is being traded on in the 
context of spring-loading is likely to be material to the extent that the public information released 
after option grant significantly affects the price of the company’s stock158 and to the extent that 
investors would find the information important in making their investment decisions. 
 
Some commentators disagree with Professor Anabtawi finding that there is both a federal 
and state common law source of the fiduciary duty.  Matthew Orso argues that under the true 
interpretation of the “disclose or abstain” rule, the disclosure of material insider information 
must be provided to the shareholders prior to the granting of the stock option.
159
 Without such 
disclosure, there is a violation of Rule 10b-5.  He finds that the Delaware Chancery has 
established that spring-loading is a breach of a fiduciary duty in Tyson I and Tyson II, further 
discussed in Part IV below.  Orso concludes that “if the federal securities laws are ‘designed to 
protect shareholders from trading on incomplete or inaccurate information,’ then the SEC is 
failing this goal in regard to spring-loading.”160 
 
Assuming that a federal common law fiduciary duty exists, Dirks and Chiarella imply 
that a fiduciary relationship between corporate insiders and shareholders gives rise to a duty 
imposed on insiders to either abstain from trading or disclose to shareholders “material 
nonpublic information,” that is, “information intended to be available only for a corporate 
purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone.”161 The difficulty in applying the disclose-or-
abstain rule to stock option grants is that most other cases to which the rule applied involves 
open market transactions.
162
 Option grants, in contrast, are “intra-corporate transactions” which 
do not involve a direct trade with a shareholder.
163
 The holding in Texas Gulf Sulphur would 
indicate that in the context of insider trading on option grants, disclosing the inside information 
to the compensation committee would absolve insider-executives of liability.
164
 
 
 
  2.  Insufficiency of disclosure  
 
Although there are no federal cases addressing the disclosure requirements for spring-
loading or manipulation of the timing of information release, two principles can be extracted 
from the cases applying the disclose-or-abstain rule.  First, insider trading is a breach of the 
fiduciary duties owed to shareholders,
165
 and second, using material nonpublic information that 
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is, intended for business purposes for the insider’s own self-interest is intrinsically unfair.166 
According to Dirks, the duty of corporate insiders to disclose to shareholders is not a general 
duty, but one arising from a fiduciary relationship.
167
 Although the Court has suggested that 
adequate disclosure requires a broader, more public release of information in some 
circumstances,
 168
 it is shareholders who are owed the duty of disclosure.
169
  
 
 We contend that allowing spring-loading for the sole purpose of increasing the value of 
executive options, even if the practice is disclosed, is inconsistent with the purposes of § 10(b) of 
promoting investor confidence and protecting investors.  First, a company “in possession of 
material nonpublic information, must, like other insiders in the same situation, disclose that 
information to its shareholders or refrain from trading with them.”170 This reasoning implies that 
a company cannot trade its own stock through the use of material nonpublic information.
171
  
Professor Anabtawi argues that “[a]llowing a company to time option grants around inside 
information can be analogized to allowing a company to engage in insider trading in the open 
market and then use the profits to pay its executives.”172  Furthermore, disclosure to the board 
only may not be enough to satisfy the duty of disclosure under § 10(b) because standard 
disclosure relating to executive compensation is usually considerably delayed.
173
 
 
Furthermore, although disclosure is the preferred method of the SEC and Congress in 
curbing potential abuses of executive compensation, there is little evidence to suggest that higher 
disclosure results in fewer abuses.  Many shareholders simply do not read every disclosure, or 
cannot digest effectively what these disclosures state.  According to a recent study, almost half of 
institutional investors think that disclosures about executive compensation need to be clearer and 
more comprehensive.
174
  As the Director of Governance Research at Equilar simply states, “it is 
more important than ever that companies explain to their shareholder base why the compensation 
packages they offer are appropriate in size and structure.”175 The study found that investors are 
highly dissatisfied with the compensation disclosure and that the proxies are unmanageably long 
and difficult, forcing them to rely on a small percentage of the information when making 
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decisions.  In addition, investors are dissatisfied with the structure and amount of pay of the 
executives and only 21 percent think that CEO pay is linked to performance.
176
 Therefore, it is 
unreasonable to expect SEC disclosure rules as they stand today to result in shareholders clearly 
understanding the details of the executive compensation plan they are approving.  There is a real 
need to further regulate these disclosures to ensure that the information is comprehensible to the 
average shareholder and that the executive compensation adequately correlates to performance.  
Mere disclosure of a practice of spring-loading does neither. 
 
 
3.  Legislative intent 
 
The legislative policy considerations behind the Securities Acts imply that disclosure 
should be extensive.  The 1933 Act was intended to “‘substitute’ . . . ‘a philosophy of full 
disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor.’”177 Moreover, Congress passed the 1934 Act in 
hopes that it would “[renew]investors’ confidence” through  “a clearer recognition upon the part 
of the corporate managers of companies whose securities are publicly held of their 
responsibilities as trustees for their corporations.”178  The 1934 Act was the answer to the public 
concern of the “unscrupulous insider . . . [using] inside information for his own advantage.”179  
The legislative history, which takes account of the concerns giving rise to the need for and the 
popularity behind the Acts, suggests that “an executive must disclose material nonpublic 
information in some manner prior to an option grant, or refuse the options, in order to discharge 
the federal duty to disclose or abstain.”180 
 
Professor Anabtawi argues that the 1934 Act promotes full disclosure and requires the 
board of directors to “avoid making materially misleading statements in connection with a 
securities transaction.”181  The legislative intent behind the Acts also supports the argument that, 
the “disclose or abstain” rule ought to also bar materially misleading omissions.182  As 
shareholders often base their investment decisions on corporate communications, it is imperative 
that these board disclosures are both honest and full.
183
Moreover, there is an expectation that 
stock option grants are part of the executive compensation plan to incentivize officers to make 
decisions that raise the company’s stock price. When stock options are spring-loaded, but this 
fact is omitted from corporate disclosures to shareholders, the shareholders are misguided about 
the extent of the incentive device.
184
  
 
                                                     
176
 DAVID F. LARCKER ET AL., supra note 174, at 2. 
177
 Orso, supra note 119, at 648 (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963)). 
178
 Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 73-1383, at 13 (1934)). 
179
 Id. 
180
 Id. at 649. 
181
 Id. (quoting Anabtawi, supra note 136, at 880 (citing Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Securities 10(b) of 
the Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385, 415 (1990)). 
182
 Id. 
183
 Id. 
184
 Id. (citing Lucian A. Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried & David I. Walker, Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the 
Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 820 (2002)). 
32 
 
In In re Cady, Roberts & Co.,
185
 the SEC considered factors that are just as powerful in 
arguing against insider trading, as they would be in relation to spring-loading.
186
 The court 
focused on two factors in analyzing whether there is an affirmative duty to disclose material 
information.  First, the SEC looked for a relationship that provides access to information that is 
“intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of 
anyone.”187  Second, the SEC analyzed whether allowing one party to take advantage of that 
information is unfair.
188
  This interpretation was used in Texas Gulf Sulphur, where the court 
found that “the purpose of the Securities Exchange Act was to prevent unfairness and 
inequalities in securities transactions.”189  The court also noted in a footnote that the Act was 
envisioned to “eliminate the idea that the use of inside information for personal advantage was a 
normal emolument of corporate office.”190 The themes of unfairness and inequality are focal 
points in analyzing whether spring-loading and the manipulation of the timing of information 
flow should be considered illegal.  
 
Furthermore, gaming release of information contradicts the economic purpose of insider 
trading prohibitions.  In Texas Gulf Sulphur, the court found that Rule 10b-5 was Congress’ 
attempt to level the risks in the financial market among insiders and outsiders, so that all have 
equal access to potential profits.
191
  Mandatory disclosure and insider trading prohibitions affect 
the way that investors act.  Investors are usually risk-averse, and disclosure of information gives 
them a higher level of trust and confidence in the market.  This reduction in risk means lower 
cost of capital for the firm because investors agree to a lower rate of return during time of public 
disclosures.
192
 This goal is undermined by the use of spring-loaded stock option grants. 
 
  4.  Nature of the harm 
 
Some scholars disagree with Commissioner Paul Atkins’ arguments alleging the legality 
of spring-loading, finding both that a  party is harmed by the practice and that the decision to 
award loaded options does not fall within the discretion of the corporate board of directors under 
the business judgment rule.
193
  Professor Hughes argues that there is a counterparty that is 
harmed by spring-loading, specifically as (1) spring-loaded options represent a cost to the 
corporation and its shareholders,
194
 and (2) the benefits that may be intended for shareholders 
cannot compensate for the costs of the practice. 
195
 Therefore, spring-loading is not a victim-less. 
 
First, options represent real value and cost to the corporation as they dilute the value of 
current stock.  The practice also “conceals from investors the full scope of the costs attributed to 
                                                     
185
 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). 
186
 Hughes, supra note 119, at 793. 
187
 Id. at 786 (citing In re Cady, 40 S.E.C. at 912).  
188
 Id.  
189
 Id. at 787 (citing 401 F.2d 833, 851-52 (2
nd
 Cir. 1968)). 
190
 Id. (quoting Texas Gulf, 401 F.2d at 848, n.9). 
191
 Id. at 787 (citing Texas Gulf, 401 F.2d at 851-52). 
192
 Id. (citing Joel Seligman, The Reformulation of Federal Securities Law Concerning Nonpublic Information, 73 
GEO. L.J. 1083, 1118 (1985)). 
193
Id. at 789. 
194
 Id. at 789-90. 
195
 Id.  
33 
 
management compensation.”196  Before 2005, the options awarded to employees were included 
as compensation expenses only if the exercise price on the date of the award was less than the 
market price.
197
  Therefore, spring-loading “conceal[ed] from investors the full scope of the costs 
attributed to management compensation.”198  Spring-loading prior to 2005 was in fact 
“artificially inflating corporate profits.”199  Furthermore, even though all employee stock option 
awards create diluted costs for shareholders, spring-loaded options aggravate the problem.  The 
practice increases the chance that a manager would exercise the option because timing the option 
award with the release of good news places the option at a more favorable position than the 
market price.
200
 
 
5.  Role of incentives 
 
 
It has also been argued that spring-loading does not result in compensation incentives that 
align officer incentives with the incentives of the shareholders.
201
 After all, the higher the 
increase of the stock price vis-à-vis the option’s exercise price, the greater the compensation for 
the officer. Hence, spring-loading “destroys the performance benefit that stock options are 
intended to provide shareholders,”202 because “[f]rom the outset of the grant, a spring-loaded 
option immediately provides the officer with an unrealized profit.”203 Moreover, the possibility 
of spring-loading would presumably lead investors to question the effectiveness of the option 
grants in promoting long-term company performance because spring-loading allows corporate 
officers to unfairly profit without the intended incentive to act to maximize shareholder value.  It 
would be virtually impossible under these circumstances to predict the incentive effects of the 
adoption of an option plan or of individual grants. While the practices does not completely 
eliminate the incentive to perform (the higher the eventual stock price, the more wealth to the 
officer) the practice decreases the performance incentive stock options were intended to provide 
in exchange for compensation.
204
 Thus, it may be appropriate to require disclosure by executives 
who are granted options while in possession of inside information similar to that required of 
insiders in their open market dealings, that is, substantive disclosure of the inside information to 
shareholders before the grant is made or abstention from accepting the grant.  
 
C.  Bullet-Dodging 
 
Although spring-loading and bullet-dodging achieve the same result – the grant of stock 
options at a price lower than what they would have been otherwise – and are essentially mirror 
images of each other, courts differ on whether bullet-dodging raises the same legal issues as 
spring-loading.  In Desimone v. Barrows,
205
 the court distinguished spring-loading (which it 
                                                     
196
 Hughes, supra note 119, at 790 (citing Anabtawi, supra note 136, at 852). 
197
 Id. at 789. 
198
 Id.  
199
 Id. 
200
 Id. at 790. 
201
 Id. at 791. 
202
 Id.  
203
 Id.  
204
 Id. 
205
 924 A.2d 908, 944. 
34 
 
likened to an in-the-money option grant) from bullet-dodging, noting that in the latter case the 
market has already absorbed the negative information and thus bullet-dodging involves a strike 
price at the stock’s actual market price.206  That is, bullet-dodging does not involve trading on 
non-public material information because the relevant information will already have been released 
by the time of grant.   
 
Moreover, Dirks states that “an insider will be liable under Rule 10b-5 for inside trading 
only where he fails to disclose material nonpublic information before trading on it and thus 
makes ‘secret profits.’”207 Because the relevant non-public information that the insider-executive 
has about the company is already public by the time the grant is made, liability must be 
established by some other means.  Yet, the practice of bullet-dodging itself, if not disclosed, 
would seem to constitute material, non-public information.  To the extent that bullet-dodging 
influences executive compensation, bullet-dodging practices are likely to be considered material. 
 
IV. Corporate Governance Implications:  Fiduciary Duties 
 
In addition to potentially violating federal securities laws, manipulation of stock options 
more clearly violate the fiduciary duties of the executives and directors.  Corporate officers and 
directors owe the corporation and its shareholders the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty, and 
imbedded in these duties is the obligation to act in good faith.
208
  In addition, these individuals 
may also be violating their duties of disclosure when participating in the manipulation of stock 
options.  
  
 
A.    Overview of Fiduciary Duties  
  
 Corporate officers and directors are primarily obligated to uphold their fiduciary duties of 
care and loyalty, and breaches of these duties may give rise to liability for damages to 
shareholders.   These duties are discussed below. 
 
1.  Duty of Care 
 
The duty of care imposes a “reasonable person” standard on officers and directors, 
requiring that they inform themselves “prior to making a business decision, of all material 
information reasonably available to them,”209 and to play an active role in protecting the interests 
of the corporation and its stockholders.
210
  Whether a fiduciary was informed of “all material 
information” is a fact-specific question as to the quality of the information, the advice 
                                                     
206
 Id. 
207
 463 U.S. 646, 654 (citing In re Cady, Roberts, & Co., 40 S.E.C., at 916, n. 31.) 
208
 Narayanan et al. supra note 4, at 1622. 
209
 William M. Lafferty, Lisa A. Schmidt & Donald J. Wolfe, Jr., A Brief Introduction to the Fiduciary Duties of 
Directors Under Delaware Law, 116 PENN. ST. L. REV. 837, 842 (2012) [hereinafter Lafferty et al.] (citing Smith v. 
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984))). 
210
 See id. 
35 
 
considered, and whether the fiduciary had “sufficient opportunity to acquire knowledge 
concerning the problem before acting.”211 
 
Delaware courts consider a variety of factors related to the fiduciary’s actions and 
knowledge in determining the fiduciary’s compliance with the duty of care.212 The standard with 
respect to the duty of care is gross negligence, which in this context has been judicially defined 
as “reckless indifference to or a deliberate disregard of the whole body of stockholders or actions 
which are without the bounds of reason.”213  Delaware statutory law, however, permits 
corporations to include in their articles of incorporation a provision exculpating directors from 
monetary liability to the corporation and shareholders for breach of the duty of care.
214
 Most 
Delaware corporations have adopted a provision exculpating their fiduciaries to the extent 
possible under § 102(b)(7).  Notably, this exculpation provision does not apply to violations of 
the duty of loyalty or the obligation of good faith.
215
  
 
The duty of care also implies a duty to monitor the behavior of management. In In re 
Caremark International, Inc. Derivative Litigation (Caremark), the Delaware Court of Chancery 
indicated (in dicta) that directorial liability may attach for failure to implement adequate 
reporting systems.
216
  The court stated that because “relevant and timely information is an 
essential predicate for satisfaction of the board’s supervisory and monitoring role,”217 “a 
director’s obligation includes a duty to attempt in good faith to assure that a corporate 
information and reporting system, which the board concludes is adequate, exists.”218  The court 
further defined a multi-factor test to determine when directors breached their duty of care.  To 
establish a violation of the duty of care, plaintiffs would need to show that (1) the directors knew 
or should have known that the violation of law was occurring, (2) the directors took no steps in a 
good faith effort to prevent or remedy that situation, and (3) the failure to take steps proximately 
resulted in the losses complained of by the plaintiffs.
219
 
 
    
2.  Duty of Loyalty 
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The duty of loyalty requires that corporate officers and directors act in the best interest of 
the corporation and prioritize the interests of the corporation over their own self-interests.
220
 
Corporate fiduciaries must “affirmatively protect the interests of the corporation,” in addition to 
“refrain[ing] from doing anything that would work injury to the corporation” or depriving it of 
profit or advantage that the fiduciary might otherwise lawfully have brought to it.
221
 Therefore, a 
fiduciary “must not have disabling conflicts of interest.”222  If there is such a conflict, the board 
must take affirmative steps to ensure the decision-making process is not tainted by the 
conflicts.
223
   
 
The Delaware courts will find corporate officers or directors to be in breach of the duty of 
loyalty if they:  “(i) cause the corporation to engage in an interested transaction which is not 
entirely fair to the corporation;”224 “(ii) profit from the use of confidential corporate 
information;”225 “(iii) take any action solely or primarily to entrench themselves in office;”226 or 
“(iv) otherwise place benefits to themselves or to affiliated entities ahead of benefits of the 
corporation.”227 The Delaware courts have generally considered a director fully independent only 
when his or her decision is solely based on the business merits of the transaction.
228
 The 
traditional example of a breach of the duty of loyalty is when a fiduciary either appears on both 
sides of the transaction or collects a personal benefit that the corporation does not.
229
  
 
  
3.  Acting in Good Faith 
 
There has been much debate about whether there is a separate duty of good faith.
230
  
Regardless, the duty of care and loyalty imbed the fiduciary duty of good faith.
231
  It also goes 
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beyond those duties, as it requires the fiduciary to take “all actions required by a true faithfulness 
and devotion to the interests of the corporation and its shareholders.”232 The good faith 
requirement generally requires an “honesty of purpose” and genuine respect and care for the 
interests of the fiduciary’s constituents.233  The Delaware courts, however, presume that directors 
are acting in good faith,
234
 thus the corporate law jurisprudence tends to focus on the components 
of a claim of bad faith.
235
  
 
The Supreme Court of Delaware has held that bad faith may be shown where the 
fiduciary 1) intentionally acts with a purpose other than that of advancing the best interests of a 
corporation, 2) acts with the intent to violate applicable positive law,
236
 or 3) intentionally fails to 
act in the face of known duty to act, demonstrating a conscious disregard for his duties.
237
  Other 
actions taken in bad faith “include any action that demonstrates a faithlessness or lack of true 
devotion to the interests of a corporation and its shareholders.”238  Furthermore, the reason for 
the failure to act in good faith does not matter.
239
  
 
 4. Duty of Disclosure 
 
Although the Delaware courts have stated that there are no other fiduciary duties outside 
of the recognized duties of care, loyalty, and perhaps good faith, some applications of these 
duties may include the duty of candor or disclosure.
240
 Therefore, if there is a federal duty of 
                                                                                                                                                                           
loyal (e.g., if the director is interested in a transaction subject to the entire 
fairness standard and cannot prove financial fairness), but there is no case in 
which a director can act in subjective bad faith towards the corporation and act 
loyally. . . . For example, one cannot act loyally as a corporate director by 
causing the corporation to violate the positive laws it is obliged to obey. 
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disclosure, it must be understood in the context of the other fiduciary duties.
241
 The duty of 
disclosure requires fiduciaries to disclose material information to shareholders.
242
 This duty has 
been specifically articulated by the Delaware courts in cases where the board requests a 
shareholder vote on the matter at hand.   For example, in Turner v. Bernstein, the court drew on a 
long list of cases and stated:  
 
The fiduciary duty of disclosure flows from the broader fiduciary duties of care 
and loyalty. That disclosure duty is triggered (inter alia) where directors . . . 
present to stockholders for their consideration a transaction that requires them to 
cast a vote and/or make an investment decision, such as whether or not to accept a 
merger or demand appraisal. Stockholders confronted with that choice are entitled 
to disclosure of the available material facts needed to make such an informed 
decision.
243
 
 
This judgment and reasoning were recently affirmed by the Delaware Supreme Court in 
Skeen v. Jo-Ann Stores, Inc.,
244
 where the court stated “[d]irectors must disclose all material facts 
within their control that a reasonable stockholder would consider important in deciding how to 
respond to the pending transaction.”245 Determining whether information is material is a fact-
specific inquiry, wherein “[a]n omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a 
reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote.”246 
  
Although the responsibility to disclose all material information is generally applied in the 
context of mergers and acquisitions of companies, it could have an impact on executive 
compensation grants insofar as they are approved by the shareholders.  In this context, a director 
or officer may be in breach of the duty to disclose, as well as a duty of care, loyalty or to act in 
good faith, when the shareholders vote on the compensation plan and are not provided with all 
material information to make an informed decision.  In either case, this duty to disclose sheds 
light on a general policy that shareholders should not be misguided about information that they 
must approve through a vote.  
 
B.  Standard of Review 
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Delaware courts apply two primary standards of review to cases involving fiduciary 
duties in corporate transactions:  the business judgment rule and the entire fairness standard.  The 
business judgment rule is a court-established default presumption that “in making a business 
decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest 
belief that the action taken was in the best interest of the company.”247  Therefore, the doctrine248 
protects the ability of corporate directors to make business decisions on behalf of the corporation 
without facing personal liability.  The rule fights against the risk-averse nature of directors and 
pushes them to make difficult calls that they believe in good faith to be beneficial for the 
corporation and its shareholders, albeit potentially risky. 
 
The rule is a deferential standard of review.  The Delaware courts will generally refrain 
from imposing their judgment upon the business and affairs of a corporation when the board’s 
decision can be attributed to a rational business purpose.
249
  The rule establishes a presumption 
that the business decision made by the directors should not be substantively reviewed by the 
courts, so long as certain preconditions exist.
 250
 A plaintiff may overcome the business judgment 
rule by demonstrating that the directors breached their fiduciary duties of care or loyalty.
251
  If 
the plaintiff is not able to do so, he or she is not entitled to any remedy, unless the action is 
considered to be waste.
252
 
 
Traditionally, the rule applies to directors that are reasonably informed, disinterested and 
independent, as well as acting in good faith.
253
 The presumption applies to cases where there is 
no evidence of “fraud, bad faith, or self-dealing in the usual sense of personal profit or 
betterment” by the directors.254  The rule does not apply, however, to directors who made an 
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“unintelligent or unadvised judgment.”255  Furthermore, directors who have not exercised 
business judgment due to inaction are also not protected by the rule.
256
 
 
Modern jurisprudence regarding the business judgment rule also includes cases where the 
independence of the board is questionable.
257
 Specifically, a board’s decision will not receive the 
benefit of deference under the business judgment rule where self-interested directors (1) 
constitute a majority of the board;
258
 (2) control or dominate the board as a whole;
259
 or (3) fail to 
disclose their interest in the transaction to the whole board, an interest which a reasonable board 
member would regard as having a significant effect on those directors’ evaluation of the 
transaction.
260
  Even under these circumstances, however, the business judgment rule is applied 
where procedural formalities and safeguards are utilized, such as special committees, stockholder 
approval, or even partial review of the action by a court.
261
  
 
Compensation decisions are generally afforded the protection of the business judgment 
rule.  Yet, in Weiss v. Swanson,
262
 for example, the court acknowledged that the rule “applies to 
the directors’ grant of options pursuant to a stockholder-approved plan only when the terms of 
the plan at issue are adhered to.”263 Therefore, when there is evidence to support an “inference 
that the directors intended to violate the terms of stockholder-approved option plans,” the 
business judgment rule is rebutted.
264
  
 
The entire fairness standard may apply to both directors and officers.  For directors, this 
standard only comes into play if the plaintiff demonstrates facts sufficient to overcome the 
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business judgment rule.  Executives and directors engaging in related-party transactions – where, 
for example, a majority of the directors approving the transaction are interested parties – may be 
subject to the entire fairness standard of review.
265
  In the absence of arms-length bargaining, 
executives are obligated to disclose such transactions and seek approval by an independent 
committee of the board.
266
  If the executive fails to obtain independent approval, the burden is to 
show that the transaction is entirely fair.
267
  To satisfy this burden, the executive must 
demonstrate “to the court’s satisfaction that the transaction was the product of both fair dealing 
(i.e., process) and fair price (i.e., substance).”268 
 
Notably, a major obstacle in all derivative actions is the “demand” requirement, under 
which a shareholder must first make demand on the corporation's board of directors before 
challenging a decision, giving it the opportunity to determine whether pursuing the action is in 
the best interest of the corporation.
269
  In Delaware, a plaintiff may overcome a failure to make 
demand under Rule 23.1 by pleading with particularity why demand would be futile.
270
  The 
courts apply two different tests depending on who made the decision being challenged. If the 
plaintiff’s challenge is to a decision made by the board, the plaintiff must satisfy the Aronson 
test.
271
 When a plaintiff challenges a decision not made by the board of directors, however, a 
different test (known as the “Rales test”) applies.272  
 
 
C.  Fiduciary Duty Implications of Options Manipulation 
 
1.  Backdating  
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Options backdating does not comply with the abovementioned fiduciary duties due to the 
dishonest, manipulative, and self-serving nature of the act.  Especially considering this practice is 
meant to enrich the executive at the expense of the company as a whole and shareholders in 
particular, it stands in complete contrast to the ideal expressed through these fiduciary duties.  It 
is not surprising that a number of scholars have suggested that options backdating is a result of 
weak corporate governance practices in corporations.
273
  
 
The board of directors may be implicated in breaching this duty.  Increasing or 
decreasing executive compensation, including through options backdating is within the board’s 
right, so long as it is disclosed properly to the shareholders.
274
  The board is protected by the 
business judgment rule, which will shield these decisions against liability in most cases, unless it 
can be proven that the board acted in bad faith or there was conflict of interest.
275
  The business 
judgment rule does not apply, however, where the board violates its fiduciary duties through 
deception to the company and shareholders.
276
  Additionally, board members may be implicated 
if they knew of or should have known that executives were changing the dates of the option 
grants without approval and took no action.
277
 
 
In Ryan v. Gifford, the plaintiff contended that the board of directors of Maxim Integrated 
Products, Inc. (Maxim), a California computer chip manufacturer, actively approved Maxim’s 
compensation committee’s backdating of option grants issued to the former Chairman and 
CEO.
278
  The complaint alleged that these approvals contravened the Maxim shareholder-
approved stock option plan, which prohibited the granting of options at exercise prices below the 
closing price on the date of the grant, and that the directors made false representations regarding 
the option dates in public filings.
279
  Notably, the plaintiff had not alleged specific facts showing 
actual backdating by the committee, relying instead on a report by Merrill Lynch which stated 
that each of the challenged grants was made on a date on which Maxim’s stock traded at 
unusually low trading days of the year in question, or on days immediately preceding sharp 
increases in the market price of the stock.
280
 
 
In denying the defendants' motion to dismiss in Ryan, the court held that "the intentional 
violation of a shareholder approved stock option plan, coupled with fraudulent disclosures 
regarding the directors' purported compliance with that plan, constitute conduct that is disloyal to 
the corporation and is therefore an act in bad faith."
281
  The court further held that allegations of 
such intentionally misleading conduct is sufficient to rebut the business judgment rule.
282
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Importantly, the Ryan case indicated that evidence of options backdating would 
overcome the demand futility requirement.  The court held that making demand clearly would 
have been futile on directors who knowingly violated the company's stock option policy and then 
issued false disclosures to shareholders and the SEC concealing such practices.
283
  According to 
the court, “[b]ackdating options qualifies as one of those 'rare cases [in which] a transaction may 
be so egregious on its face that board approval cannot meet the test of business judgment, and a 
substantial likelihood of director liability therefore exists.”284 
 
In Desimone v. Barrows, the Delaware Chancery Court dismissed backdating claims 
against the directors in a shareholder derivative suit for, among other reasons, failing to meet the 
“demand” requirement and, as to grants made to outside directors, for failure to state a claim.285 
The corporation, Sycamore Networks, Inc., had “essentially admitted” in public filings that 
options had been backdated, and “the options were represented to the public as having been 
issued at fair market value, when in fact they were issued at a price lower than the fair market 
value that prevailed as of the dates of the Grants.”286  Three categories of grants were made:  
grants to non-officer employees, grants to executive officers, and grants to outside directors.
287
 
 
With respect to non-officer employee option grants, the court found that the complaint 
failed to allege facts relating to “the key issues of who approved the Employee Grants and 
whether any of the directors knew that options were being backdated,” and thus, there was 
insufficient basis to conclude that the Sycamore board “faces a substantial threat of liability” 
with respect to this category of demands, so the plaintiff’s failure to make a demand was not 
excused.
288
  Notably, the “stockholder-approved option plans contemplated delegation of the 
option-granting function to non-director executive officers,” and most of the backdating was 
done by a single executive officer and actively hidden from the board and auditors.
289
  Unlike the 
shareholders in Ryan, the plaintiff could not allege that any of the directors knowingly approved 
improperly-backdated options, and thus demand was not excused.
290
  Thus, in order for a 
backdating claim to succeed against directors, it is necessary for the plaintiffs to show that the 
board was either complicit in the behavior or should have known what was going on, under a 
Caremark analysis. 
 
Scholars have suggested that boards implement controls to monitor stock option 
backdating and other manipulative practices of stock prices. Some ways to safeguard against 
these practices is to prohibit unanimous written consent for approval of option grants and single-
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person compensation committees.
291
  In addition, conflicts of interest should be avoided.
292
  We 
provide further proposals in Part V below. 
 
2.  Spring-Loading and Bullet-Dodging 
 
It has been argued that the business judgment rule should not apply to spring-loading 
decisions because the high potential for abuse ought to warrant “a less deferential stance to 
protect shareholder interests.”293  The business judgment rule presumes that directors make 
informed decisions, however, officers are usually better informed about corporate performance. 
Hence, officers have a conflict of interest in disclosing certain information to the directors, 
including timing of stock option grants.
294
  If plaintiffs show that the directors were not 
independent and well-informed when making these decisions, the rule does not prohibit judicial 
review.  
 
In Weiss v. Swanson,
295
 the plaintiff alleged that certain former and current directors of a 
company issued 22 spring-loaded and bullet-dodged option grants.  The options were granted in 
accordance with the stockholder-approved option plans, but the majority of the grants “were 
made in conjunction with quarterly earnings releases” and “the director defendants approved 
grants before positive releases and after negative releases.”296 Therefore, the court could infer 
that these particular directors granted spring-loaded and bullet-dodged options.
297
  The court 
stated that “it is reasonable to infer that stockholders would consider the practice of timing 
options described in the complaint to be important in deciding whether to approve the option 
plans or to reelect board members.”298  Furthermore, because the defendants did not disclose the 
practice in the plans, subsequent proxy statements, or SEC filings, “the allegations … give rise to 
an inference that the Director Defendants, in violation of their fiduciary duties, intended to 
circumvent the restrictions found in the plans.”299  Hence, the court found the plaintiff succeeded 
in establishing reasonable doubt that the option grants were a product of a business judgment 
exercise.
300
  
 
The Weiss court also noted that “[a] director does breach his duty of loyalty if he knows 
that the company has been defrauded and does not report what he knows to the board or to an 
appropriate committee of the board, at the very least when he is involved in the fraud and keeps 
silent in order to escape detection.”301  Thus, spring-loading, where the executive knows material 
nonpublic information, while keeping the board in the dark, amounts to fraud and breach of duty 
of loyalty.
302
 
                                                     
291
 Narayanan et al., supra note 4, at 1619. 
292
 Id.  
293
 Hughes, supra note 119, at 792. 
294
 Id.  
295
 948 A.2d 433, 441 (Del. Ch. 2008). 
296
 Id.  
297
 Id. at 442-444. 
298
 Id.  
299
 Id. at 443. 
300
 Id.  
301
 Hoover Industries, Inc. v. Chase, 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 332, 1988 WL 73758 (Del. Ch. 1988).  
302
 Justin Fox, Dodging bullets, loading springs, and backdating options, TIME (Oct. 31, 2006), 
http://business.time.com/2006/10/31/dodging_bullets_loading_spring/.   
45 
 
 
  In In re Tyson Foods, Inc. (Tyson I), the Delaware Chancery Court held that spring-
loading can give rise to a breach of fiduciary duty claim.
303
  The Tyson I shareholders alleged 
that the directors approved the compensation committee’s spring-loading of option grants in 
violation of the shareholder-approved stock option plan.
304
  The complaint alleged that, on 
several occasions, the compensation committee had awarded options shortly before the 
corporation issued press releases containing favorable information, foreseeably leading to 
increases in the price of the company’s stock.305  The court first observed that "[w]hether a board 
of directors may in good faith grant spring-loaded options is a somewhat more difficult question 
than that posed by options backdating; " whereas "all backdated options involve a fundamental, 
incontrovertible lie” in falsifying the date of option grant, "[a]llegations of spring-loading 
implicate a much more subtle deception" because the spring-loaded options are set at the market 
price on the date of the grant, which does not explicitly violate stock option plans.
306
 
 
Nevertheless, the court concluded that “[g]ranting spring-loaded options, without explicit 
authorization from shareholders, clearly involves an indirect deception,” and a board of directors 
breach their duty of loyalty when they distribute shares to managers “in such a way as to 
undermine the very objectives approved by shareholders” in a shareholder-approved option 
plan.
307
  In effect, the court focused on the purpose of the shareholder-approved plan, rather than 
the technical requirements.  According to the court, even if a director authorized options with a 
market-value strike price in compliance with a shareholder-approved incentive option plan, the 
director may have acted in bad faith if at the time he knew that the shares were worth more than 
the exercise price.
308
  Furthermore, if the directors, at the time of the grants, were aware of 
material non-public positive information, then they would have known that they were granting 
options with exercise prices that were less than the actual value of the underlying shares on the 
date of grant.
309
  The court observed that in spring-loading cases, the impropriety is not simply in 
granting an option that is, in practical effect, immediately in the money (an action that, in some 
circumstances, could be a legitimate exercise of business judgment) but, rather, in the 
accompanying deception of shareholders.
310
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The court concluded that the grant of spring-loaded options may, under certain limited 
circumstances, constitute a breach of fiduciary duty.
311
  Such a grant is beyond the protection of 
the business judgment rule if the awards are made pursuant to a shareholder-approved plan and if 
the directors who approved the allegedly spring-loaded grants:   (a) possessed material 
information soon to be released that would affect the company’s share price; and (b) issued the 
options intending to circumvent shareholder-approved restrictions on their exercise price. 
 
The complaint in Desimone v. Barrows,
312
 discussed above regarding the implications for 
backdating, also alleged claims against the board of directors for spring-loading and bullet-
dodging by the executive officers.
313
  Although the court noted the size of the grants and the 
identities of the recipients indicated that decisions about the officer grants were less likely to 
have been delegated to non-director executive officers, the allegations did not support an 
inference that “the board or even the Compensation Committee was likely to have driven details 
like the precise date of issuance of the Grants.”314  With respect to the spring-loading allegations, 
the court sought to distinguish Tyson I by focusing on the differences in the directors’ knowledge 
of and involvement in the timing of the option grants in the two cases. According to the court, 
although both Tyson I and Desimone involved officers receiving options just before a positive 
announcement, the plaintiff in Desimone did not “plead facts that suggest that members of the 
Sycamore board approved the Officer Grants with knowledge of corporate information that, if 
made public on the date of the Grants, would have increased the fair market value of the 
corporation’s stock.”315  In Tyson I, “the plaintiffs pled a multi-year pattern of large grants 
occurring at random times of year that preceded large, market-moving announcements,” whereas 
the plaintiff in Desimone only pled that the corporation made officer grants two weeks before a 
far less impactful positive announcement.
316
  Furthermore, the grants in Desimone “were subject 
to a three-year vesting schedule with sharp restrictions on pledging the options received.”317  
Finally, two of the officers on Sycamore’s board of directors owned a significant portion of the 
company, yet received none of the options in dispute, a fact that “powerfully undercut[s] any 
inference that the board itself had a motive to make its executive officers fat at the expense of the 
stockholders.”318 
 
The Desimone court also pointed out that, in contrast with the facts in Ryan, the 
stockholder-approved plan under which the officer and employee grants had been made 
explicitly permitted the issuance of in-the-money stock options.
319
  As to bullet-dodging, the 
court opined that insofar as bullet-dodging did not violate the terms of the stockholder-approved 
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agreement, such allegations are unlikely ever to support a claim for relief, other than, in extreme 
circumstances, a claim for corporate waste (if approved by independent and disinterested 
directors) or self-dealing (if approved by interested or controlled directors).
320
 
 
A third category of option grants was made to Sycamore’s outside directors.  As to the 
claims relating to grants to interested directors, the court noted that demand was excused and the 
pivotal issue was whether the complaint stated a claim upon which relief could be granted.
321
 
Those grants had been made under a shareholder-approved plan setting the amounts and dates of 
option grants to directors over a multiyear period.
322
 Because the allegations of the complaint 
raised no inference of manipulation or impropriety, the court dismissed the claims relating to the 
outside director grants for failure to plead facts upon which relief could be granted.
323
  
 
The Desimone court also addressed directors’ oversight obligations under the Caremark 
standard.  The court refined the requirement of cognitive culpability by saying that "directors 
have to have acted with a state of mind consistent with a conscious decision to breach their duty 
of care."
324
  According to the court, Caremark “plainly held that director liability for failure to 
monitor required a finding that the directors acted [in bad faith] because their indolence was so 
persistent that it could not be ascribed to anything other than a knowing decision not to even try 
to make sure the corporation's officers had developed and were implementing a prudent approach 
to ensuring law compliance.”325 This is a very high burden of persuasion, and liability will not 
reach the director who simply fails to use due care in attending to her business and 
responsibilities. 
 
In ruling on a subsequent motion in the Tyson litigation (Tyson II),
326
 the court sharpened 
the distinction with Desimone. The Tyson II decision, issued August 15, 2007, denied the motion 
by outside director defendants for summary judgment.
327
  The court examined its earlier refusal 
to dismiss the claim in Tyson I, and in light of the “more clearly delineated” allegations with 
respect to the current motion,
328
 altered the basis for allowing plaintiffs’ claim to proceed. 
 
In their motion for judgment on the pleadings, defendants argued that the allegedly 
spring-loaded options were “nonqualified stock options,” which Tyson I’s compensation 
committee could make exercisable at any price, as authorized under the company’s shareholder-
approved stock option plan (in contrast to plaintiffs’ previous claims).329  The court accepted this 
assertion, finding it confirmed by a review of the stock option plan and Tyson I’s proxy 
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statements.
330
  The assertion appeared to invalidate the premise upon which the defendant’s 
motion to dismiss had been denied:  that the options “may have been issued with the intent to 
circumvent otherwise valid shareholder-approved restrictions upon the exercise price of the 
options.”331  Rather than compel the granting of defendants’ motion, however, the absence of 
such restrictions shifted the analysis to broader ground. 
 
According to the court, the question addressed in Tyson I was the relatively narrow one of 
“whether a grant of spring-loaded options could be within the bounds of the Compensation 
Committee’s business judgment in the face of a shareholder-approved agreement explicitly 
requiring a market value strike price.”332  But in light of the “more clearly delineated” allegations 
in Tyson II, the court indicated that the test stated in Tyson I for determining whether spring-
loading is beyond the protection of the business judgment rule was possibly “couched in too 
limited a manner.”333  To overcome the business judgment rule, it may not be absolutely 
necessary to allege an implicit violation of a shareholder-approved stock incentive plan with 
respect to spring-loading; rather, a reasonable inference “that a board of directors later concealed 
the true nature of a grant of stock options” suffices to find a fiduciary breach of loyalty.334  Thus, 
under Tyson II, the adequacy of company disclosures about the award of spring-loaded options is 
key in determining whether fiduciary duty was breached.  In the instant case, the court found the 
defendants’ disclosures regarding the challenged options “did nothing to rebut the pleading stage 
inference that the defendants intended to conceal a pattern of unfairly stocking up insiders’ 
larders with option grants shortly before the announcement of events likely to increase the 
Company’s stock price.”335  In fact, the magnitude and timing of the grants, in the absence of 
“disclosure of the reasons motivating the grants, is suggestive … of a purposeful subterfuge.”336 
 
The court also insisted that the Tyson I defendants’ persistent failure to disclose the 
motivations for the stock option grants made the case distinguishable from Desimone.  The 
Tyson II court found that its conclusions were consistent with two hypothetical scenarios 
discussed by the Desimone court
337
 because both hypotheticals “assume[d] that the board of 
directors has revealed their strategy to shareholders in complete and utter candor. In the absence 
of a shareholder-approved plan, the board clearly discloses in the merger proxy that these grants 
are rewards for exemplary service.”338 
 
   
IV.  Proposal for Reform   
 
Our evidence shows that executive option grants continue to show distinct signs of 
manipulation during the 2008-2014 period.  It has been nearly ten years since 2006 when the 
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scandals broke regarding the backdating of executive stock option grants.
339
  As discussed above, 
numerous firms have been sued in civil and criminal courts, with settlements amounting to 
millions of dollars.  In addition, the SEC has instituted new reporting requirements to prevent 
any future manipulations.  Despite all this effort, corporate executives appear to be still 
benefiting from manipulating their option grants.    
 
To prevent any future manipulations of executive option grants, we suggest a simple but 
extremely effective remedy through the SEC’s rule-making authority.  We recommend that the 
SEC institute a new rule that automatically requires daily allocation of executive option grants.  
To explain this further, suppose that firm A awarded 365 options to its executives on January 1.  
Under our proposed new rule, the firm would be required to spread these options through the 
course of the entire year, enabling the executive to earn just one option for each day worked.   
The simplest way of implementing our new rule is to use the average stock price over the entire 
year from January 1 through December 31 as the exercise price for all these options.   
 
The net effect of our suggested rule is that executives will no longer be able to benefit 
from any of the dating and timing games documented in our study.  Any backdating, spring-
loading, bullet-dodging or any other game that benefits one option will necessarily hurt the other 
options, thereby cancelling its effects.  Furthermore, our rule is easy to understand and easy to 
implement. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this study, we found that executives still continue to manipulate their option grants.  
We show that despite all the reforms in response to the backdating scandal of 2006,
340
 
manipulation of options is still too tempting and continues to this day.  Our evidence shows that 
executives employ a variety of manipulative devices to increase their compensation, including 
backdating, bullet-dodging, and spring-loading.  Although each of these practices in isolation 
may have a small marginal impact on their compensation, together, these practices unfairly tilt 
the balance in executives’ favor in a meaningful way.  Overall, we find that as a result of these 
manipulative devices executives are able to increase their compensation by about 6% in the 
2008-2014 period.   
 
To date, these behaviors have eluded meaningful regulation.  This may be due, in part, to 
the difficulty in proving motivation and intent.  Inadvertent backdating does not give rise to 
securities fraud.  Furthermore, in hindsight, executives may be able to construct plausible reasons 
for the timing of information releases and option dates, although analysis of the data suggests 
otherwise.  Current rules against securities fraud have not addressed options manipulation in an 
effective way. 
 
Our recommendation calling for daily allocation of option grants is a simple regulatory 
reform that should put an end to executive option dating and timing games, once and for all.  As 
discussed above, option dating and timing games raise serious issues under federal securities 
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laws and state fiduciary duties.  Under our proposal, executives would no longer benefit from 
any of the dating and timing games documented in our study.  Any backdating, spring-loading, 
bullet-dodging or any other game that benefits one option will necessarily hurt the other options, 
thereby cancelling its effects.  This modest proposal, if implemented, should go a long way 
toward eradicating this illicit, self-serving behavior, in accordance with the intent of federal 
securities laws and state fiduciary duty obligations. 
